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1 Introduction
This article provides a provisional synthesis of
the results obtained from anthropological
fieldwork carried out in 2009 on the delivery of
four ‘public goods’ (water and sanitation, safe
motherhood, security and markets) in three sites
in Niger (Balleyara, Say and Guidan Roumdji).1
The research found that all the public goods
selected corresponded to real shared
preoccupations among the local populations, who
have high expectations and consider the state
and local political authorities to have
responsibilities in these matters. All of the four
goods are thus elements of a wider shared sense
of the general interest.
Analysis of the concrete delivery of these public
goods was the point of departure for the
empirical research; this revealed that the
delivery modes are aggregates of various
components, each of which poses specific delivery
problems. The diversity of these components
requires that we distinguish them carefully,
because the bottlenecks, the infrastructural
requirements and the actors involved vary from
one component to the other. We call the
combination of actors, institutions and means
which permit the delivery of a public good, its
delivery configuration. This configuration is made
up of a number of component configurations.
For instance, the particular delivery
configuration of the component ‘evacuation of
patient in case of obstructed pregnancy’ includes
as essential actors the midwife or nurse, people
who are able to pay for the transport, the
ambulance driver, elements of the FNIS
(National Security Corps) and a functioning
operating theatre and blood supplies at the
referral centre. It also assumes the availability of
the ambulance itself and the means of obtaining
it. The general configuration for the delivery of
babies involves in addition, traditional birth
attendants (TBAs) and trained TBAs (matrones),
the mayor’s office, the President’s Special
Programme, various projects supporting
maternal health, and even the chiefdom, as well
as a staffed and equipped health unit, and
maintenance procedures for the ambulance.
Critical bottlenecks and collective action
problems tend to arise at the level of the
component configurations, which means that
different solutions may be needed for each kind
of component. In the case of safe childbirth, for
instance, three bottlenecks stand out, all three
concerning the treatment of obstructed
pregnancies: (1) in the case of delivery, which
starts at home, the rapidity of the evacuation to
a health unit; (2) the rapidity of the evacuation
from the health unit to a functional operating
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theatre; and (3) the existence of a functional
operating theatre at the level of the district
hospital, with qualified staff who are available –
and blood.
Our selected public goods were delivered through
a multiplicity of modes of governance. The overall
delivery configurations therefore involved
combinations of actors and modes of governance
with various forms of co-production: collaboration,
substitution, competition, complementarity. The
modes of governance are associated with specific
kinds of accountabilities. In the absence of formal
coordinating frameworks situated at some
superior level, the actors and institutions which
contribute to the co-delivery of a service are subject to non-
commensurable particular accountabilities. The official
is bureaucratically accountable to his head of
service; the mayor is representationally accountable
to his commune council and his electors; the Chief
is reputationally accountable to his peers and to his
family (that is, to his subjects); the local non-
governmental organisation (NGO) is financially
accountable to the international NGO that
sponsors it, and so on.
After a brief description of the historical context,
we proceed to describe how these public goods
are delivered by different institutional modes of
governance. We then present some variables that
may influence the quality of the delivery. Among
them, coordination between local actors and
institutions appears decisive, in a context where
public goods are generally co-delivered in a mix
of formal and informal arrangements.
2 The historical context
We should recall that it was through colonialism
that the modern state came to Niger, and that
the form of public goods delivery it adopted was
a particularly despotic one. At independence, the
single party (RDA) ruled the country in a way
that continued to be autocratic and very ‘state-
centric’, with party committees at all levels. The
military regime of Kountché which followed
produced an upsurge of concern for discipline, at
the same time creating a mass youth
organisation, the samaria, as a form of local
mobilisation and collective action (although
under strong central control).
With the National Conference in 1991, the
country entered a democratic phase which was
somewhat turbulent but marked by a number of
new factors: the legacy of structural adjustment;
years of unpaid salaries; the rolling back of the
state from certain of its service functions and
areas of authority; and the coming of
multipartyism and electoral patronage. The two
main characteristics of this period were: 
(1) the conversion of the political and state elite
to unbridled forms of competitive political
patronage, fuelled by growing business
involvement and the hegemony of big traders;
and (2) an increased dependence on aid.
The characterisation of democracy as a state of
‘anarchy’, where indiscipline, corruption and
division prevail, is a frequent theme among our
interlocutors. It certainly captures something of
the truth, but also a certain nostalgic idealisation
of the past under the military dictatorship. The
fact that public services functioned better in that
era is also due to a number of co-factors (and
thus not only to the vertical, authoritarian and
repressive character of public management
under Kountché): the ‘boom’ in uranium
revenues which took place in that period; a much
smaller population, and fewer services delivered
to a much smaller percentage of it; a more
limited and less complex bureaucracy; growing
indebtedness and external assistance that was
more flexible than it became under structural
adjustment, etc.
In 2004, a new mode of local governance
emerged: 256 communes were created, with, for
the first time, elected councils and mayors.
We cannot develop here the historical dynamics
of our four public goods. However, to summarise,
two types of delivery emerged over time: for
certain goods, there has been a progressive
transformation of the delivery conditions since
the pre-colonial era (markets and water); for
other goods, there has been a rupture between
the old conditions of delivery and those that
apply today (security, sanitation and safe
motherhood).
Finally, the studied goods are connected in
different ways to the outside world, the ‘global
economy’ and international expertise. While the
markets are linked to their production sources in
China, Dubai or Europe, their modes of
organisation are primarily domestic and engage
little with the outside. By contrast, water and
sanitation, which figure among the Millennium
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Development Goals (MDGs), increasingly
involve techniques and procedures which are
standardised at world level. The same is true of
safe motherhood, which follows schemas
promoted by the World Health Organization
(WHO) in all countries of the South. Finally,
security is a highly national and local affair (in
regard to the official monopoly at least),
paradoxically largely disconnected from the
internationally coordinated ‘terrorism’ issue.
3 Provision of the four public goods by modes of
local governance
3.1 The bureaucratic mode: weaknesses and paradoxes
of the state presence
Although the state is present everywhere and its
external signs are numerous, its presence is in
fact not very effective, with its agents often
demobilised, frustrated and demotivated. The
state remains a central actor in regard to health
and security, but is much less effective in water
and markets.
A real territorial network
The presence of the state is manifested, first of
all, by its official representatives, the governors,
prefects and sub-prefects, who have authority over
all the de-concentrated public services (and also
have oversight of the communes). Health is without
doubt the public service that is best organised,
best structured, most embedded and most
functional. The forces of order (gendarmerie and
national security forces, FNIS) also cover the
whole territory. Contrary to widespread ideas
about ‘the retreat of the state’, these professional
bodies are expanding. Others, in contrast, are
declining or are seeing their functions
transformed, like the water technicians. But the
‘real’ operation of these services, far from meeting
their declared objectives and satisfying users’
expectations, is often criticised by the latter.
Serious under-provision of materials and means of
operation
The poverty of the state services is spectacular.
Certainly, all the services are represented in the
prefectures and the communes, not only on paper
but in terms of staff establishments, but they do
not have quarters worthy of the name, and they
lack materials, means of operating and means of
transport. For water, the departmental services
are limited to a single agent who has no vehicle
and no office. The forces of order in the three
case study districts have <10% of the fuel
allocation that they require to perform their
mission, and virtually no functioning vehicles.
The operating budget of the community
development service in Balleyara is 60.000 CFA
Fr per year (<100 Euros) and even this is not
always disbursed.
Only the health services seem to at least function,
well or badly, at the lowest level (with nursing
officers), thanks to cost recovery. In fact, payment
for medical services (user fees) does permit the
provision of generic medications. However, serious
operational problems persist in the referral chain,
like the absence of blood supplies in district
hospitals. As for equipment, situations vary
greatly from one health unit to another,
particularly at the level of district hospitals, and
also according to whether there is a development
partner (DP) active in the field or not.
Human resource problems
In such a state of deprivation, the state agents
who are present on site but lacking means of
working are often discouraged. In technical
services like water, hygiene and sanitation,
community development, livestock and
agriculture, there is in general just one agent,
isolated and out of practice, occasionally two
(most often a national service conscript).
In contrast, the health personnel are more
numerous, especially the auxiliaries (clinical or
outreach assistants, first-aid workers, trained
TBAs, community health workers and
managers), badly paid or not paid at all. But for
them there are two problems. On the one hand,
the hierarchy of the health service has great
difficulty in managing postings in a coherent
way. The more distant CSIs (base-level health
units), even if they serve many clients, have only
one nursing officer, whereas in important centres
there is sometimes a plethora of personnel.
Reform-minded doctors seldom remain for long
in one place. As for the midwives, they pose a
problem that is well known in health circles.
They refuse to be posted to rural areas or, if they
live in one, they refuse to be moved, ‘pulling
strings’ in various quarters to get their way. The
influence they mobilise may be local, as in the
case of the immovable midwife in Guidan
Roumdji (known as the ‘queen mother’) who is
protected by her brother, the canton chief. But
the interventions can also come from highly
placed officials in the national political or
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administrative system who are the spouses or
parents of the midwives (Jaffré and Prual 1993).
In addition, the behaviour of the health
personnel presents numerous problems. It is
severely criticised by service users, who refer to
absenteeism, contempt, abusive treatment and
rackets.
Creative improvisation and informal privatisation
But non-respect for official norms and
procedures can also be the effect of a desire to do
better at delivering the expected services. Thus
the mayor can, by paying for the fuel, mobilise a
patrol by the forces of order without going
through the prefect. A village chief can ask a
nurse to treat a patient on credit, under his
guarantee. An ambulance can evacuate a
pregnant woman directly to Niamey or Maradi
instead of passing through the district hospital,
as required by the regulations. Traders may be
permitted to declare themselves mere ‘hawkers’
in order to be able to make use of socially
subsidised water sources.
The most positive examples of this are the
various improvisations used by the anaesthetist
and surgeon’s assistant in Guidan Roumdji, who,
very much contrary to the official rules,
undertakes basic surgical interventions (including
caesareans) at the district hospital often because
the doctor is not present. The personal factor
appears to be an important element.
These various ways of ‘making do’ are also more
and more taking on a monetised form, in the
sense that provision by state agents is being
financed by users or third parties in default of
being paid for by the state itself. This informal
privatisation at the level of everyday living has
become almost institutionalised, and it allows
goods of general interest to be provided to some
degree in spite of the failures of the state. The
most striking example is security. The costs (fuel
and per diems) of off-base patrols and
interventions in conflicts in the countryside by
the gendarmerie and FNIS are paid either by the
mayor’s office, by contributions by peasants
collected by the chiefs, or by the complainant
himself. These non-official practices are not
concealed and are approved de facto by the
representatives of the state, the prefects (who
themselves make use of some of the patrols).
One might also mention the ‘hiring’ of elements
of the FNIS at Balleyara by big traders to assure
the security of their truck convoys. It is worth
noting that the per diems issued to the security
forces (6,500 CFA Fr per day per man) are
significant compared with their salaries, and
amount to a ‘topping up’ of their income.
Informal privatisation is thus not just a practical
device for making it possible to deliver the
service; it also benefits the providers themselves.
There is of course another side to informal
privatisation; it can become a racket, benefiting
only the providers to the detriment of the users.
This happens for example when the forces of
order entrap the fishermen of Say at night, or
the midwives take excessive amounts of money
from expectant mothers.
3.2 The project-based mode
Development partners have become unavoidable
actors in the local delivery of public goods,
making up to some extent for the shortcomings
of the state, at the same time by providing public
services with some of the means of operation
that they lack, and substituting for them by
means of direct interventions or the promotion
of associational structures.
At least 13 external actors were present in the
three sites. Most often, the interventions are not
coordinated, each DP or NGO having its own
action programme. The state services officially in
charge of coordination (Community
Development) and the mayors complain of never
receiving reports or of being sidelined (in
particular for water: ‘Each of them put their wells
where they like’!). The DP interventions are
unequally distributed between the public goods
and their basic components: on security and on
water quality for example, they are little
involved. Some of the main bottlenecks are thus
ignored by projects, each of which pursues its
own particular logic, searching out problems for
the solutions it is offering (Naudet 1999).
External aid can be about infrastructure or about
operational inputs, training, or finally
management systems (these elements often
being combined).
The bulk of local investment is thus the work of
projects. Neither the communes nor the state have
real budgets for investment using their own
funds, and all work in the expectation of
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eventual external finance. Markets are typical:
while the communes, like the state, depend on the
taxes raised in markets for their main local
revenues, they do not invest a single franc in
these markets, and in the three sites the
rehabilitation of the locales and the construction
of modern infrastructure has been the work of
DPs (a German project, FICOD, invested
200 million CFA Fr in Balleyara). Modern tube
wells, mini-irrigation systems and human-labour
pumps, are all financed by projects.
With respect to operational expenditures, the
role of projects is more difficult to capture. It is
very variable across the services, sometimes they
complement an effort by the state or the
communes and sometimes they constitute the only
real resource. In health, external interventions
are of the ‘complementary’ type, in particular in
the form of ‘vertical’ programmes like the
general provision for patient-centred antenatal
consultations, or the prevention of mother-to-
child transmission of HIV/AIDS. In contrast,
water services work only with the support of
projects, either in the form of help to communes,
villages or groups of individuals to set up
projects, or in the form of monitoring, but always
with some specific financial assistance from the
project. The distribution of trainings of all sorts
among local actors is another important activity,
one which constantly mobilises human resources
in the three sites and is entirely project-financed.
The TBAs are an example of a group trained in
this way.
Finally, the interventions of projects under the
infrastructure or operational inputs headings
also imply the importation of a certain amount of
institutional engineering, in other words, new
structures, new procedures and new
management systems. An important part of this
institutional engineering by DPs is the pressure
on ‘communities’ to create committees that will
then manage development funds and
infrastructures, in the name of ‘participation’.
3.3 The associational mode
Four types of association may be identified. The
first type is inspired by development projects.
The funding of the rehabilitation of the three
markets and the support to household waste
management was accompanied by a strong
pressure for the creation of management or
neighbourhood committees. In Guidan Roumdji,
with the support of SNV (the Netherlands
Development Organisation), this was initially
successful: the garbage carters, recruited with
the help of the neighbourhood chiefs, were paid
regularly thanks to the contributions of 50 CFA
Fr per household. But following political
conflicts, the family heads began little by little to
refuse to pay the contributions, and the carters,
not having been paid, refused to continue to
work and started making private use of the carts.
An almost identical scenario took place in Say.
The market management committees that were
established in Balleyara and Guidan Roumdji by
the municipalities also collapsed. The aim was
different in this case: it was to exercise control
over the tax collectors (nominated by the
mayors’ offices on political criteria) who were
suspected of diverting part of the revenue. But
these committees quickly became in their turn
the object of accusations of misappropriation.
Another type of association has been created on
a nationwide scale by the state in order to
associate communities with new public policies.
Typical are the management committees created
for health units after the Bamako Initiative for
the implementation of cost-recovery. They are
composed of representatives of the population,
and oversee cost recovery, the local recruitment
and payment of auxiliaries, and the purchase of
medicines. Whatever the difficulties of these
committees, they have permitted a broadly
satisfactory functioning of the cost-recovery
system and the provision of medicines, providing
a real ‘voice’ to users and offering a right of
oversight to local notables. They operate
routinely throughout the country, on the basis of
internally generated resources and without
injections from projects. The health committees
at district and regional level have sometimes
taken the initiative to finance the costs of
evacuations (fuel and personnel costs) by taking
a few ‘additional pennies’ from all the users of
health centres (in other words, a tax, including
on those patients exempted from fees under the
policy of free care).
A third type is associational structures locally
created to compensate for the ‘gaps’ in state
service provision, while laying claim to a public-
interest mission. The obvious example is in the
field of security: youth militias called yambanga
which, in Balleyara and Guidan Roumdji, patrol
the city at night. This type of association is a
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joint effort to meet a social need: others are the
tontines (savings groups) which provide help for
marriages, baptisms or births.
It is worth noting that the last two associational
types work with local resources (users’ fees for
the health management committees, donations
or subscriptions for the yambanga, contributions
for the tontines).
But by chance, we also came across an
unexpected fourth type of association, which
appears quite efficient and effective: corporate
private-sector bodies, formal (transport unions)
or informal (cattle brokers, butchers). The bus
stations in the three towns are entirely managed
by the bus owners’ and drivers’ unions: from the
organisation of the duty roster for managing
passengers to the collection of the commune
departure tax from the owners, and security
surveillance, all is taken in hand by the unions.
They use a system of teams and an allocation
formula for the funds collected which is very
complex but totally functional. In Say, the
transporters’ association even pays a labourer to
sweep the station, which is particularly clean.
The sale of livestock through brokers is an older
arrangement, but the latter have adapted to
modern market sale conditions and have little by
little put in place a complex and functional
system, with a menu of charges for each type of
livestock detailing precisely what is due to the
broker. The abattoirs too are managed in an
apparently satisfactory way by the associations of
butchers. These different corporate bodies,
organised on a local basis, are nevertheless
present in every town in Niger, and their only
source of revenue is payments by customers.
3.4 The municipal mode
Decentralisation is recent: the communes with
their municipal councils and elected mayors were
only created in 2004. It is also a troubled process.
The state has failed to deliver the promised
subventions or even to pass onto them the taxes
which are their due, showing itself more
concerned to control and even repress them than
to support them. For their part, the mayors,
generally elected on the basis of local coalitions
between parties, have been challenged a great
deal, and sometimes deposed, mostly on the basis
of suspicions of misappropriation. In nearly two-
thirds of communes, there have been attempts to
depose mayors, and in nearly one-third, they
have been successful. This testifies both to the
importance of local factional struggles and to the
role played by the ‘room for suspicion’ that is a
feature of collective management.
Despite these undoubted problems, particularly
lack of budgetary resources and absentee
mayors, the communes have in the space of a few
years made themselves indispensable. The
mayors have taken a prominent place among the
important actors in the local arena, especially at
the level of the administrative centre of the
canton. The budgets, insufficient as they may be,
and whatever the weaknesses in their
management, contribute in a non-negligible
fashion to the provision of goods of general
interest.
Because the markets are the principal resource
for the communes, the latter have recruited a
network of tax collectors who have replaced
those previously nominated by the chiefs, and
they have been active everywhere in increasing
the rate of tax recovery. But the mayor’s office
puts little back into the markets from its own
resources, and relies on external projects when it
comes to infrastructure.
Mayors are only marginally involved in security
and health, limited to putting a little money into
the maintenance or repair of gendarmerie vehicles
or the ambulance. They have no authority over
the forces of order or over health personnel.
Nevertheless, they have been involved in the
efforts to provide the needed extra pennies for
evacuations, and indeed in Balleyara it was the
mayor’s office that took the initiative.
3.5 The chiefly mode
The district chiefs (chefs de canton) who are the
most important and by far the most prestigious
level of the administrative chiefdom (Tidjani
Alou 2009), have been deprived of certain of
their competences in favour of the mayors. In
particular, they no longer have authority over
markets. But they retain more or less officially
two functions: the collection of personal levies
(the commune tax) on behalf of the mayor’s
office; and primary-level hearings on divorce
cases and rural conflicts (like land disputes or
the conflicts between agriculturalists and
herders). They continue to maintain courtiers
and ‘horsemen’ in their service. At the village
level, where the municipalities are absent, the
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village chiefs remain the only real form of public
authority. The mayors refer to them, as do other
agents who have matters to pursue in the rural
milieu.
Today the chiefs, who were and remain
auxiliaries of the state, are thus condemned to
collaborate with the mayors’ offices as they did
previously (and still do) with the prefects and
other services of the state.
The district chiefs also retain important
influence through two channels: on the one
hand, they are by right members of the commune
councils (on a consultative basis); on the other
hand, they ‘place’ and protect their ‘kinsmen and
dependants’ at the level of various local
structures (municipal council, management
committees, health personnel, garbage carters,
etc.). This influence by way of clientelism can
block reforms and creates a local bottleneck, as
in Guidan Roumdji where the ‘queen mother’
and other kin of the canton chief employed in the
health sector seem to be ‘untouchables’ whom it
is impossible to move despite innumerable
complaints about their behaviour.
Finally, the district chiefs may play from time to
time a ‘broker’ role in regard to projects (as in
Guidan Roumdji for the rehabilitation of the
wells).
3.6 The merchant mode
Around the edges of the delivery of the four
general-interest goods, a multiplicity of small
jobs has flowered, filling gaps in the delivery
chain or becoming grafted onto it, for example
for water and sanitation, there are plumbers,
cesspool emptiers, well-diggers and masons,
water sellers, and supervisors of standpipes and
latrines; for health, private nurses, birth
attendants, guards, handymen and ambulance
drivers. Sometimes, these small trades give rise
to a small rural artisan business, such as the
fabrication of plastic bags of ‘pure’ water.
In two of our three sites, large private companies
are also present. SEEN (Société d’Exploitation
des Eaux du Niger, a subsidiary of the
international group Veolia) distributes water in
Say and Guidan Roumdji. But they are blamed
for not guaranteeing the continuity and quality
of the service, for unduly frequent interruptions
and, in Guidan Roumdji, for the bad taste of the
water. SONITEL (Société Nigérienne de
Téléphone) and NIGELEC (Société Nigérienne
d’Electricité) have installations in the commune of
Say and on this basis should pay significant taxes
to the commune. But they accumulate arrears
which the commune is unable to recover.
4 Some potential variables relevant for the
quality of service delivery
The variables which might explain better
performance in the delivery of the four goods are
particularly difficult to identify. Nevertheless,
some tentative ‘potential explanatory variables’
may be proposed.
4.1 Coordination among local actors and institutions
Coordination seems to be by far the most
important factor. Monopolies of provision no
longer exist, if they ever really did. No mode of
local governance, no institution and no privileged
actor is a sole player in respect of any of the
goods. Given that there is nearly always a variety
of delivery configurations, what matters are the
conditions under which each delivery configuration
optimises or not the possibilities for collective action, and
tackles the bottlenecks identified for each good.
Complex delivery configurations pose
coordination problems. Rather than considering
collective action problems in an abstract and
formal way, our research analyses the constraints
in a specific context: what coordination between
which actors is necessary for the provision of
which goods (with what components) and at
what level of quality? The coordination remains
almost always informal, and is dependent on the
good will of local actors: there is no global
framework overarching the various forms of local
co-delivery, no higher instance of coordination.
It is possible to distinguish two distinct families
of local delivery configurations, in which
collective action problems are posed in different
ways. In one, co-delivery is organised in order to
mitigate the weaknesses of an officially
monopolistic but in practice dysfunctional
bureaucratic mode of governance. Where there is
complete absence of the state bureaucracy, the
configurations are polycentric.
In the case of security and safe motherhood, co-
production is improvised on the ground, in order
to ‘save’ the users, partly because the official
providers, the security forces and the public
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health system are not in a position to deliver
their goods in a satisfactory fashion. Lack of
resources is obviously a major cause of this. It is
only the mobilisation of other actors and
institutions that allows a minimal service to be
provided. In other words, these two goods are
provided through what are basically ‘rescue’ or
‘recovery’ configurations.
It is in the security sector (officially a monopoly
of the state) that the informal collaboration is
most surprising. The off-base patrols of the
gendarmerie in response to land conflicts, using
their vehicle and including the participation of
the FNIS (no vehicle), also involve the
collaboration of some of the ‘horsemen’ of the
chief. Fuel is paid for by contributions from the
population collected by the village chiefs or by a
donation from the mayor’s office.
For maternal heath, the evacuations are only
possible thanks to an ambulance provided by the
Special Programme of the former President of
the Republic, but this involves a nurse, a
member of the FNIS, while fuel and ancillary
costs are paid for either by a tax imposed
(illegally) on the users of the health centre, or by
the family of the expectant mother, by an
insurance scheme or the mayor’s office.
For the other two public goods, the bureaucratic
mode of governance is no longer a central
provider. Their delivery configurations are
therefore polycentric and ‘splintered’ across
parallel institutions. Rather than coordinating,
they intervene separately, each with its own
programme, and undertaking its own actions. For
example, when it comes to wells, each
development project does its own drilling using
its own criteria. The markets are divided into
distinct spaces (central market, livestock market,
bus terminal, abattoir, etc.), each of which has its
own modes of organisation.
There is nevertheless one institutionalised
coordination framework, limited to the very
specific domain of conflict over land issues. The
Land Commissions (COFOs; official bodies at all
governmental levels) agree common norms,
stabilise land tenure and identify those with
legitimate claims. So one finds chiefdoms,
mayor’s offices, state services, NGOs and herders
associations all involved in the sector. But only a
few of the COFOs perform well. This original
and ambitious formula seems to have a real
impact only when two conditions are satisfied:
(1) the presence of a permanent (paid) secretary
who is competent, and (2) the support of a
project providing operational inputs (logistics,
transport, etc.). This is the reason the
COFODEP (Departmental Land Commission) of
Guidan Roumji seems to work well.
The role of district chiefs in coordination needs
also to be recognised. On the one hand, the
chieftaincy is no longer an institution which is in
a position to deliver goods in an autonomous
fashion; it is not even a central actor in the
various configurations. But on the other hand, it
can play an important role in respect of
coordination or linkage, using its negative or
veto power. Without the agreement of the chief,
or at least a minimum engagement on his part, a
collective action can be strongly handicapped.
The capacity of the chiefs to take any initiatives
is in practice strongly affected by their personal
qualities and backgrounds. Many chiefs are
former senior officials. They have important
networks within the higher levels of the public
service, and they have many of ‘their men’ sitting
in the municipal councils. These facts reinforce
their strategic position as individuals in relation
to problems of coordination.
Finally, the findings undermine any concept
implying an opposition between the formal and
the informal. Coordination involves formal as
much as informal actors (e.g. the gendarmerie, the
prefect, private security guards, yambanga,
mayors and the chief ’s horsemen, all contribute
to security). Moreover, the formal actors
themselves often operate in an informal manner
(e.g. the FNIS escorting trucks on their own
account). Finally, the informal actors are often in
the process of seeking formal recognition (the
case of the yambanga) (Lund 2009).
4.2 The decisive role of local reforming leaders
Improvement in the delivery of goods involves a
form of charisma (in the Weberian sense), given
that personal relationships are central to the
various processes of informal coordination to
which we have drawn attention. But this
observation, which may seem banal raises two
important questions: How can the action of a
reformer become ‘routinised’ so that it outlives
the particular individual? Under what conditions
are reformers able to emerge?
IDS Bulletin Volume 42  Number 2  March 2011 39
The first question poses the problem of local
reformist alliances. The actions undertaken by an
isolated reformer never survive his departure.
Routinisation implies in all cases the adoption of
the reform measures by a significant collectivity
of concerned actors (in practice by certain active
members of the delivery configuration). A
reformer needs to transform the prevailing
practical norms (e.g. by modifying certain
aspects of the working cultures of state services
or municipal councils).
The second question poses the problem of the
relation between ‘reform contexts’ and the
presence of ‘reformers’. Thus, certain public
policies (generally co-produced by the state and
donors) can create ‘windows of opportunity’ which
certain local actors, for example the COFOs, can
seize upon with a view to improving the delivery of
a good. This is connected to the next variable.
4.3 A local strategic utilisation of the DPs
Quite often, the presence of the DPs (which is a
long-term affair, not the ‘temporary support to
take-off ’ which it claims to be) provides ‘reform
contexts’ and ‘windows of opportunity’. The
capacity of local leaders to mobilise the DPs to
address critical bottlenecks (or to ‘manipulate’
projects to serve local development objectives)
should therefore be considered carefully. The
customary tendency is to set up an opposition
between the endogenous (local and informal) and
the exogenous (development projects) so that
donor interventions are seen only in terms of the
imposition of norms from outside, badly adapted
to local contexts. In fact we found that a public
policy, even if it is initiated by an external donor,
always gets partly appropriated – as it is
implemented – into the strategies, logics and
games of local actors. In turn, these processes
can allow a local reforming actor to transform a
new general public policy into a micro-reform
according to his own agenda and adapted to the
local practical norms.
4.4 Informal privatisation
Privatisation can sustain the provision of a
service, albeit on commercial terms, when the
state is no longer able to meet its obligations, for
example through collecting contributions to pay
for the fuel and per diems of the gendarmes, or
paying private guards. In such cases, informal
privatisation is linked with a certain form of
formal privatisation, as with cost-recovery in
health; the state pays the salaries of the health
personnel, and the users pay for the medicines.
In effect, this produces a system of state-user
co-financing, or semi-privatisation, of health.
There also exists another form of informal
privatisation, where the user finances are not
just part of the delivery of the service instead of
the state, but also a premium which accrues
directly to the official in question. The latter,
paid by the state to deliver a service, only does so
if he is also paid by the user. This is one of the
‘elementary forms of corruption’ (Blundo and
Olivier de Sardan 2006). The problem is that
these two types of informal privatisation are
often mixed together. When a trader pays the
gendarmes to escort his lorry, he is co-financing the
delivery of a public service, but he also provides a
‘bonus’ to the gendarme.
State-user co-financing of public services (in the
form of either formal or informal semi-
privatisation) poses, nevertheless, the intractable
problem of access for the poorest: in the absence
of any stable institutional support to the most
deprived, are there any systems of social
solidarity (based on family, patronage or charity)
which permit the latter to get free access to
goods that are only being provided for cash?
4.5 The system of contributions
This is an equally common and indeed
generalised form of state-user co-financing. It
can arise from informal privatisation, but it can
also be a form of direct delivery of a service
outside the state. Instead of payment by the
individual at the point of delivery, the
contributions are collected and managed by
intermediary actors. These ad hoc charges
affecting users or the actors involved in the
service provision are generally voluntary. It is a
simple, effective system which expresses well the
general-interest character of the good in
question. The initiative can come from several
types of actors: the chiefs (in the case of the
contributions by villages to pay for the gendarmes
to deal with the devastating annual
transhumance of the Oudah Fulani), the big
traders (for market cleaning) or the mayor’s
office (for payment of the garbage carters).
Contributions are also called for to meet project
conditionalities. When projects intend to make
some local investment they often require a
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minimum financial contribution from the
population, known as the ‘social counterpart’ or
‘quota’. For projects, this contribution is supposed
to guarantee ‘participation’ by the population and
to provide evidence of their interest in the
investment in question. But sometimes, a single
actor makes this contribution on behalf of the
population, paying the whole amount himself;
this may be a patron-sponsor (mécène), but can
also be the municipality.
The system of contributions has some limits: the
excessive resort to contributions (in contexts of
general poverty) engenders a progressive loss of
motivation, and the management of the funds
from contributions arouses permanent suspicions
of misappropriation on the part of the population.
4.6 The organisation of work and the management of
human resources
The state, the communes and the associations are
the three modes of local governance officially
charged with the delivery of collective goods, but
they all suffer from extreme problems of work
organisation and human resource management.
The lack of appropriate strategies, policies,
team-working and competencies leaves these
organisations in the grip of innumerable forms of
improvisation, inconsistency, double-speak and
clientelism, the latter being their main form of
regulation. The available official management
methods tend to be ‘kits’ imported from the
outside, from the colonial discipline of the chicotte
(stick), recycled with various borrowings by the
‘authoritarian’ and military regimes, through
classic European bureaucratic proceduralism, to
the instruments of New Public Management.
These systems have never been grafted
successfully onto local administrative, municipal
or associational structures, their routines and
their practical norms.
What is remarkable about the local corporate
organisations (transport unions, butchers or
cattle brokers’ local associations) is that, by
contrast, they have partly resolved this problem.
We are exploring this further.
4.7 Collective mobilisations
One of the principal successes of the military
regime of Kountché, which elicits the strongest
nostalgia, was the rehabilitation, extension,
coordination and structuring of the samaria,
youth groups organised by the authorities in a
huge neo-traditional federation with a presence
in all villages and very active in community and
cultural affairs. This was the regime’s mass
membership organisation. The military
dictatorship did not rely just on a vertical
discipline based largely on fear. It also had the
capacity to organise popular mobilisation on an
everyday basis, something that the political
parties have not been able to recreate. Samaria
involved the majority of young people and
generated a certain degree of enthusiasm around
activities including theatrical festivals, social and
sports events, reception of visitors, dancing and
singing competitions between villages, but also
cleaning days (collective street sweeping) and
collective village works. The coming of
democracy brought all this to a spontaneous end.
5 Conclusion
Two general bottlenecks, common to the local
delivery of the four public goods considered, need
to be addressed. Up to now, they have been
virtually ignored by public policies and by DPs.
One is the coordination problem, the other one is
the accountability issue.
We have already highlighted the coordination
problem. The absence of any higher level, formal
and legitimate framework, capable of
coordinating the different actors and institutions
concerned, leaves room for personal
arrangements, short-lived alliances, fragile
policies of friendship, and informal privatisation.
Communes seem to be the only official institution
designed for this task. But are they in a position
to impose or negotiate such a framework? The
answer today is ‘no’. What about tomorrow?
The accountability issue is even more complex.
Citizens/users make judgements about the quality
of the services provided, make demands, express
their expectations and sometimes mobilise around
them. They exercise voice. But who listens? One of
the many problems encountered is that most of
the different actors who are involved in the de facto
co-delivery of the public goods are not accountable
to the citizens/users. As we have seen, they come
under different particular accountabilities
corresponding to each institution. The outstanding
issue is, therefore, under what circumstances can a
sense of generalised accountability towards users
emerge, cutting across particular accountabilities,
and based on a form of shared civic consciousness
among providers?
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Note
1 The researchers were: A. Diarra, Y. Issa,
A. Aghali, A. Oumarou, H. Moussa.
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